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On July 31, 2003, the Pillowtex plant in Kannapolis, NC closed its doors, laying off over 
4,000 workers.  The notion of the “economic disaster” was born, and in recent years has come to 
be defined as occurring when a significant proportion of the community’s workforce is laid off 
through no fault of the workers, generating a high unemployment rate, a significant loss of local 
revenue, and emergency service and workforce development needs that overwhelm local 
resources.  Because these disasters are not confined to Kannapolis, but instead continue to affect 
many rural communities throughout North Carolina, key stakeholders in the State’s economic 
development agencies proposed an Action Agenda of policies and programs designed to help 
these communities and the dislocated workers who live in them successfully respond to the broad 
array of challenges presented by these economic disasters.  As part of this agenda, two key 
policy documents recommended that policy makers develop an effective, collaborative response 
to economic disasters that involved the local voluntary non-profit sector, and specifically 
suggested the use of North Carolina Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (NC VOAD)—
a natural disaster response organization—as a model for developing this program.  The NC Rural 
Economic Development Center was tasked with developing this “economic VOAD” for North 
Carolina. 
 
Based in large part on research and program development conducted on behalf of the 
Rural Center, this Master’s Project seeks to fulfill the policy recommendations laid out in the 
Action Agenda to develop a nonprofit response program for economic disasters.  Specifically, 
this paper articulates a role for nonprofits as labor market intermediaries that can help connect 
dislocated workers to the state’s workforce development system through the use of networking 
and “conversational space” for coordination and strategic planning in the aftermath of these 
disasters.  As the original economic disaster, the Pillowtex example is used as a touchstone to 
examine the broader causes and consequences of these disasters and as a model for nonprofit 
intermediaries.  Placed within a broader historical, theoretical, and policy context, the result is a 
proposed policy tool known as Resources to Recover (R2R).   
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On July 30, 2003, the town of Kannapolis was rocked by the sudden closure of Pillowtex, 
the community’s largest employer.  In what became the largest layoff in state history, thousands 
of workers lost their jobs.  Following the Pillowtex closure, state and community leaders coined 
the term “economic disaster” to describe the devastating effects that large-scale layoffs have on 
the dislocated workers who lose their jobs and on the communities where they were once 
employed.  Unfortunately, economic disasters have become routine throughout rural North 
Carolina, displacing thousands of workers and weakening dozens of communities. 
 
“Economic Disasters” and the Rural Challenge 
 
  The impacts of these layoffs are especially severe for rural communities dominated by 
traditional North Carolina industries like tobacco, furniture, and apparel that are particularly 
vulnerable to collapse following the recession of 2001 and the elimination of many protectionist 
trade policies over the past five years.  Whether the result of a single mass layoff of 200 or more 
individuals, or the cumulative result of years of smaller layoffs, any job losses that come to 
represent a significant share of the labor force translates into broad negative impacts for the 
affected communities quite similar to the negative consequences of natural disasters.  Just as 
natural disasters devastate the infrastructure of communities, so do these economic disasters 
wreak havoc on the fabric of people’s lives, often representing permanent drops in the standard 
of living for workers, their families, and their communities.  As the mills close, rural towns lose 
their major employer, and along with it, their tax base and often their primary source for 
municipal services; rural workers suddenly lose their livelihoods and face no immediate prospect 
for getting them back.  As in other rural areas throughout the world, globalization is leaving 
many of rural North Carolina’s workers behind; and before they can catch up, they must first 
survive.   
 
Defined as those who lose their jobs through no fault of their own, these dislocated 
workers face significant barriers to financially viable reemployment, coupled with a daunting 
level of financial, human, and social service needs: delinquent mortgages, unpaid medical bills, 
car payments, power bills.  The costs keep adding up, with no end in sight.   Even attempting to 
access available public assistance to meet these challenges presents crippling barriers for many 
dislocated workers, who face a byzantine labyrinth of Federal, state, and local programs offering 
a bewildering array of services requiring multiple trips to different government agencies.  Added 
to this organizational complexity are social barriers, including low educational attainment and 
literacy levels, cultural resistance to accepting public assistance or “welfare,” and a debilitating 
psychological shock from the layoff.  While some dislocated workers succeed in overcoming 
these barriers, most do not; they require direct and active assistance in two distinct phases after 
the disaster: 
 
• Short-term relief—immediate need for emergency financial and social assistance to cover 
bills, keep the lights on, and maintain basic health primary health care. 
• Long-term recovery—ongoing need for employment that provides a living wage.  In the 
global, service-oriented economy, job training is vital for achieving this goal, both for the 
dislocated worker who needs to improve his skills, and for the region’s economic 
developers who need a skilled workforce to recruit and incubate higher-wage jobs—a 
challenge made even more pressing by low educational attainment rates. 
 
Although these consequences are devastating for workers and their communities, they are 
hardly new to a nation that has experienced thirty years of economic restructuring, or 
“deindustrialization,” phenomena that have dramatically reduced traditional manufacturing 
employment throughout the United States.  In North Carolina, however, the use of the term 
“disaster” to describe the effects of deindustrialization is relatively new and reflects a changing 
policy consensus on how to help dislocated workers.  In this emerging consensus, disasters are 
seen as discrete events that can be anticipated and the consequences for workers and 
communities mitigated through systematic response planning for short-term relief and long-term 
recovery.  In recent years, the issue of long-term recovery through job training and workforce 
development has gained special prominence among policy makers in recent years, as the State 
has sought to respond to the loss of manufacturing jobs in rural communities long dependent on 
traditional and declining industries. 
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An Action Agenda for Dislocated Workers 
 
Following the Pillowtex closings, key stakeholders in the state’s economic development 
and workforce system came together in late 2004 and created a Dislocated Worker Advisory 
Committee; the Committee in turn hosted a Dislocated Worker Action Summit, with the goal of 
assembling an action agenda to address the issues related to plant closures and dislocated 
workers.  The fruit of this summit, the publication in April 2005 of Gaining a Foothold: An 
Action Agenda to Aid North Carolina’s Dislocated Workers, made ten broad recommendations 
for addressing “economic disasters” and the short-term and long-term challenges surrounding 
dislocated workers.  In an effort to implement many of these recommendations, the Workforce 
Commission initiated a series of different interagency task-forces in October 2005.  One such 
Task Force, the Dislocated Worker Task Force, produced a series of specific policy 
recommendations in June 2006 that seeks to translate the Action Agenda into reality; this 
document is officially entitled Recommendations to the Policy, Research, and Assessment 
Committee of the NC Commission on the Workforce, and is referred to in this paper as the Task 
Force Recommendations (Taskforce, 2006).   
 
Both of these policy documents proposed an innovative approach to economic disaster 
response.  While most scholarly literature and public policy have traditionally emphasized the 
role of the public sector in helping dislocated workers and their communities respond to these 
disasters, the Action Agenda proposed the use of partnerships with the voluntary, nonprofit 
sector in order to strengthen the capacity of the workforce development system, just as the 
Department of Emergency Management (DEM) has used partnerships with nonprofit 
organizations to respond to natural disasters.  
 
Specifically, Subrecommendation 8-3 of the Action Agenda called for an “effective, 
collaborative response to economic disasters involving local public leaders, and the voluntary 
non-profit sector.”  Within the body of this subrecommendation, the North Carolina Rural Center 
for Economic Development (the Rural Center) and relevant Workforce Commission staff were 
tasked with “setting up the equivalent of NCVOAD (North Carolina Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disasters) for economic disasters to channel the energy of volunteer and nonprofit 
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organizations to connect with the workforce system.”  The Task Force Policy Recommendations 
issued a similar call a year later in Recommendation IV.7 (Task Force, 17).  Just as NC VOAD 
manages the legions of nonprofit, community-based, and faith-based organizations involved in 
natural disaster response, the Action Agenda stakeholders envisioned an “economic VOAD” to 
manage the similar activities of nonprofit organizations assisting with recovery from economic 
disasters.  In North Carolina, NC VOAD is widely respected by the state’s natural disaster 
response managers, and is directly integrated into the Department of Emergency Management’s 
disaster response system.  As such, this organization provided an excellent starting point for 
designing the “effective, collaborative response” by nonprofits envisioned by the Action Agenda. 
 
In response to this tasking, the Rural Center sponsored a long-term research and program 
development agenda for a new nonprofit-centered economic disaster response model.  Based on 
the results of almost 30 stakeholder interviews and additional primary research, the Rural Center 
completed a white paper written by this author aimed at fulfilling Subrecommendation 8-3 and 
Recommendation IV.7; this paper proposed a program model that seeks to mobilize nonprofit 
organizations (a catch-all term referring to all voluntary, nonprofit, faith-based, and community-
based organizations) to help connect dislocated workers to the resources they need for immediate 




Based in large part upon this previous effort, this master’s project attempts to address the 
policy issue raised by Subrecommendation 8-3 and Recommendation IV.7, with special attention 
to the issue of addressing long-term recovery through connecting dislocated workers to the 
state’s workforce development system.   Specifically, this paper examines three critical 
questions: 
• What are economic disasters? 
• What is the role of nonprofits in responding to these economic disasters? 
• How should this role shape policy development for an “economic VOAD” and 
what should the program look like? 
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In answering these questions, this paper uses scholarly research, policy documents, and 
interviews with key stakeholders to argue that nonprofits can play a critical role in ensuring long-
term economic recovery for rural dislocated workers and their communities by acting as an 
intermediary between workers and the State’s workforce development system.  Placed in a 
broader historical, theoretical, and policy context, the concrete result is a proposed policy tool 
targeted for use in rural North Carolina by local and state stakeholders in the workforce 
development system.  Specifically, this paper proposes “networking” nonprofits together 
organizationally into a labor market intermediary called Resources to Recover (R2R) geared 
towards connecting dislocated workers to the state’s job training resources.   
 
In terms of organization, Chapter 2 will define economic disasters in the context of the 
broader phenomenon of deindustrialization, and Chapter 3 will use the scholarly research around 
the phenomenon to articulate a role for nonprofits in responding to these disasters.  In Chapter 4, 
the case of the Pillowtex response is examined in an effort to draw policy lessons from a unified 
nonprofit response to the typology-defining economic disaster in Kannapolis.  Ina n effort to 
draw additional lessons from the policy world, Chapter 5 examines existing policy approaches to 
utilizing nonprofits as labor market intermediaries throughout North Carolina.  Building on these 
discussions, Chapter 6 proposes the policy tool, or program called Resources to Recover.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this paper by drawing out generalizable conclusions about the role 
of nonprofits in responding to economic disasters. 
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II.  Economic Disasters  
 
In this chapter, the causes and consequences of economic disasters are discussed in the 
theoretical context of economic restructuring and deindustrialization, and against the historical 
backdrop of southern industrialization.  Illustrated by the Pillowtex experience in Kannpolis, 
NC—the event which coined the term “economic disaster”—this chapter argues that the deep, 
historically-rooted dependency of many rural communities upon their mills and plants magnified 
the consequences of deindustrialization into outright disasters when global economic 
restructuring fully hit traditional North Carolina industries during the 2001 recession.  While 
deindustrialization is hardly new, re-casting the phenomenon as an economic disaster is certainly 
new for North Carolina.  This chapter argues that the disaster metaphor is appropriate for two 
reasons.  First, the scale of the consequences for communities and dislocated workers in rural 
North Carolina can only be described as disastrous.  Secondly, the term reflects a new policy 
consensus embodied in the Action Agenda that disasters are distinct events that can be 
anticipated and mitigated through planning and policy.  Such planning, however, requires a 
precise understanding of what constitutes a disaster, and accordingly, this chapter reviews 
several policy debates to define economic disasters in the following way:  when a significant 
proportion of the community’s workforce is laid off through no fault of the workers, generating a 
high unemployment rate, a significant loss of local revenue, and emergency service and 
workforce development needs that overwhelm local resources.   
 
Anatomy of an Economic Disaster  
 
Often called the “perfect storm” of closures, the Pillowtex experience provides an 
excellent example to illustrate the preceding argument, as well as an important model for 
responding (to be discussed in Chapter 4).  As with many rural communities throughout the 
American South, the roots of Kannapolis’s economic disaster lie in the ways in which 
manufacturing plants became the economic, social, and financial center of gravity for the 
community.  By way of historical introduction, North Carolinian entrepreneur James W. Cannon 
built a textile mill in Cabarrus County in 1887, and named it Cannon Mills.  His new company 
provided thousands of jobs, low-rent mill-owned housing for workers, and its own set of 
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municipal services to meet the needs of its growing workforce.  As the mills expanded 
production over the next 20 years, the community surrounding the facilities began to expand, and 
in 1906, the City of Kannapolis was incorporated, encompassing territory on both sides of line 
dividing Cabarrus and Rowan counties.   
 
Kannapolis means “city of the looms,” and without question, Kannapolis owed its 
existence and its century of prosperity to the mechanized looms in Cannon Mills.  Under the 
five-decade management of James’ son, Charles Cannon, the mill experienced significant 
success, becoming one of the leading textile producers in the world.  In exchange for this 
success, Charles Cannon continued to supply city-like services for Kannapolis residents and 
partnered extensively with the town government to provide police, fire protection, and revenue 
for the city’s sewer system.  In the years following Cannon’s passing, Cannon Mills was sold to 
financier David Murdoch, who merged the company with Fieldcrest Mills in 1985 to create 
Fieldcrest Cannon.  In 1997, the company was sold again, this time to Pillowtex Corporation, at 
the time the world’s leading producer in five textile categories.  (Beatty, 2004). 
 
Like many textile companies in the late 1990s, however, Pillowtex dramatically 
overextended itself with additional production lines and the acquisition of smaller textile firms at 
the same time that falling trade barriers exposed the American industry to intense global 
competition.  These pressures proved too great, and in November 2000, Pillowtex declared 
bankruptcy; by March 2003, Pillowtex executives confirmed that they were considering selling, 
perhaps even liquidating the Kannapolis mills.  Throughout the spring and early summer of 
2003, rumors of a mass closure swirled, as Pillowtex began ramping down production and 
moved the bulk of its workforce to “short-time” (reduced shift) status.  To its credit, Pillowtex 
worked extremely hard to keep the union, the community, and the State and Federal governments 
informed of its situation.  This allowed significant advance awareness and planning for the 
impending mass layoff.  Finally, on July 30, 2003, the Pillowtex plants in Kannapolis shut their 
doors and permanently laid off over 4,800 workers, most of whom lived in Rowan and Cabarrus 
counties. (Beatty, 2004). 
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The effect of the closure was pronounced, immediate, and devastating.  Based on surveys 
conducted by the Governor’s Rapid Response Team in the week following the closure, most of 
these workers were older, with an average 17 years service at Pillowtex; 50% of these suddenly 
dislocated workers had not completed high school, 93% said they could no longer afford health 
insurance, and 43% reported being behind in rent or mortgage, as Unemployment Insurance only 
made up for a fraction of lost wages.  Although 73% of the workers initially expressed a 
willingness to attend Cabarrus County Community College to retrain, the Centralina Workforce 
Development Board observed a fundamental psychological barrier to retraining:  large numbers 
of workers seemed to live in a state of shock, unable to confront the reality of their changed 
circumstances, and many more expressed a deep discomfort with entering a community college 
and actually receiving the training in which they had expressed interest.  Aside from lives of 
individuals dislocated workers, the City itself seemed in shock; in a single day, the City lost its 
sole provider for fire services, sewage treatment, and the main source of its tax revenue.  (Beatty, 
2004).   The City and its surrounding counties were completely overwhelmed.  In the weeks 
following the closure, state officials stared across the social and economic wreckage in 
Kannapolis and, noting a disturbing similarity in effects to the devastation wreaked by natural 
disasters, coined the term “economic disaster” to describe the consequences of mass layoffs and 
plant closures.   
 
This brief historical overview of Pillowtex provides two important themes that help 
illuminate the general concept of economic disasters.  First, economic restructuring caused the 
closure of a mill inextricably intertwined with the social and economic fabric of a rural North 
Carolina town; secondly, the consequences of the closure for workers and the community itself 
simply overwhelmed local ability to respond.  These themes remain part of a broader pattern that 
gives both definition to the term “economic disaster” and explains its causes and consequences 
for rural North Carolina.   
 
Deindustrialization: Causes and Consequences in Rural North Carolina 
 
The experience in Kannapolis is not an isolated event; it is part of the decades-long 
phenomenon known as deindustrialization, itself a symptom of the broader, global, phenomenon 
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of economic restructuring.  Historically, economic restructuring began occurring in the late 
1970s, as technology and personal preferences made it simultaneously possible, desirable, and 
necessary for firms to develop flexible approaches to producing an infinite variety of products.  
Flexibility required lower production costs, a requirement which began to push production away 
from the industrialized OECD nations to the less developed countries in the global South and 
East. (Piore & Sabel, 1984).   
 
For countless communities in the United States, this global economic restructuring 
resulted in massive deindustrialization, a term first coined by Barry Bluestone and Bennett 
Harrison in the early 1980s (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982) to describe the sudden and crippling 
loss of manufacturing jobs throughout the Northeast.  In their book and influential testimony 
before Congress, Bluestone and Harrison define deindustrialization as the “widespread 
systematic disinvestment in the nation’s productive capacity,” which has left behind shuttered 
factories, mass layoffs, millions of dislocated workers, depressed wages, and shattered 
communities—symptoms identical to those witnessed in Kannapolis.  As deindustrialization has 
swept aside less competitive industries throughout the developed world, the bulk of the workers 
laid off have generally been older, less educated, and female—the most vulnerable members of 
the workforce.  Age and low education have typically reduced retraining and up-skilling options, 
long considered the best way to return workers to employment in a competitive workforce.  
(Bluestone, 1982; Neil, 1992; Perrucci & Targ, 1988).   
 
In the case of rural North Carolina, economic restructuring in core rural industries, 
coupled with community dependency on the plants closed by restructuring, created conditions 
ripe for devastation that can rightly be compared to disasters.  While much of the scholarly 
research has focused on the effects of deindustrialization in the Rust Belt or overseas, the rural 
South—including North Carolina—has also experienced this phenomenon, and, although 
economic disasters do not represent a variant of deindustrialization unique to North Carolina, 
their frequency, severity, and geographic concentration in the state’s rural communities can be 
largely attributed to historical patterns of industrialization in the American South. 
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In the days before the Civil War, King Cotton ruled the American South; forty years 
later, it was textiles, tobacco, and furniture manufacturing that dominated the economic life of 
rural North Carolina and the rural South as whole.  Beginning in the 1880s, business leaders 
throughout the region pursued industrial recruitment and economic development strategies that 
used bottom dollar wages, low unionization, and vast armies of unskilled labor to attract and 
incubate industry in primarily rural communities—the lowest cost areas in the lowest cost states.  
(Cobb, 1993).  North Carolina was no exception.  Some mills, like Stonecutter’s in Spindale and 
Cannon Mills in Kannapolis, were started by native North Carolinian entrepreneurs and 
businessmen; others were recruited from New England, or the Midwest.  Over time, these rural 
communities grew up around these factories and mills, and in the process, became economically, 
socially, and fiscally dependent upon them (Herring, 1949).  This dependency had the latent 
potential to magnify the consequences of deindustrialization into outright disasters for many of 
these rural North Carolina communities, given the right (or wrong) set of macroeconomic 
conditions in certain core industries. 
 
Over the past 30 years, these conditions have slowly taken shape.  As a result of 
economic restructuring and increased global competition, rural North Carolina has faced 
significant losses to many of its core manufacturing employers since the mid-1970s.  Nearly half 
of the state’s rural counties experienced a net loss of manufacturing jobs in the 1980s, and while 
conditions improved briefly in the mid-1990s (fueled largely by overexpansion of the textile 
industry), they began to worsen significantly by the turn of the century, as the state continued to 
lose traditional manufacturing jobs.  The small, mid-decade improvement actually portended 
even harder times for rural areas, as employment growth occurred largely in advanced 
manufacturing sectors in urban areas, again leaving the less educated rural worker behind.  
(Action Agenda, 8-9).  Many of the remaining traditional manufacturing establishments hung by 
a thread in rural areas, protected in part by the overall growth in the state’s economy.  When the 
economy entered recession in 2001, however, the weaknesses in the tobacco, furniture, and 
textile industries could no longer be masked.  Coupled with falling trade barriers scheduled into 
existing and new international trade agreements, the 2001 recession intensified the decline of 
these traditional manufacturing sectors, resulting in a breath-taking loss of 350,000 
manufacturing jobs from 2000 to 2003—an almost 45% decline (Action Agenda, 9).  The effects 
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of these macroeconomic forces had predictably negative consequences for rural North Carolina.  
Incomes fell, and unemployment remained higher in rural areas through 2004 than urban areas 
(Ibid) perhaps reflecting the higher educational attainment levels and advanced manufacturing 
presence already in these areas.  
 
The result of this decline, as illustrated in the Pillowtex example, has been the sudden 
dislocation of thousands of workers in rural communities, many of whom fit the profile of the 
workers discussed in the scholarly literature on deindustrialization.  According to research by the 
North Carolina Employment Security Commission (ESC), the average dislocated worker in rural 
North Carolina is less educated, earned significantly less income, and is less likely to regain 
employment in the year following a layoff than a similar dislocated worker in an urban 
community.  In rural counties, a majority of dislocated workers are women, nearly half of all 
dislocated workers are 45 or older, and African Americans constitute almost half of the total 
number of dislocated workers while only representing 12% of the total labor force.  Perhaps most 
critically, 85% of dislocated workers in rural areas possess a high school diploma or less; fully 
20% lack a basic high school education, presenting significant obstacles to succeeding in an 
increasingly educated, global economy.  (Action Agenda, 9). 
 
From these figures, it is clear that like their global counterparts, dislocated workers 
generally come from the most economically vulnerable groups in society, and by 2004, income 
data began to reveal that these vulnerabilities were crippling their long-term economic 
sustainability.  As one state policy document reported, the ability of dislocated workers “to find 
new jobs at anything close to their old wages has proved to be an elusive quest for far too many.”  
(Action Agenda, 10).  Indeed, the ESC projected that statewide dislocated workers’ replacement 
wages in 2002 clocked in at less than three-quarters the amount of pre-layoff wages—a 25% 
drop in income for those fortunate enough to find a job.  By 2002, however, almost half of rural 
dislocated workers proved even less fortunate, and were completely unable to find employment 
at all within one year of their lay-off.  In the same year, only 61% managed to find work two 
years after their layoff.  And all the while, bills go unpaid, primary medical needs cannot be met, 
and people suffer the psychological consequences of their world falling apart. 
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Adding to these structural problems, dislocated workers face the challenge of navigating 
a Byzantine array of Federal, state, and local programs, services, and eligibility requirements 
available to them following their layoffs.  The Action Agenda identified this problem as a 
“complicated, confusing set of services” and workers’ lack of adequate information on how to 
access these services.  (Action Agenda, 22).  In the Pillowtex experience, for example, dozens of 
workers failed to realize they were eligible for certain training-related services or failed to secure 
them from public agencies despite multiple information sessions held by the State’s Rapid 
Response Team.  (Beatty, 8).  Reinforcing this complexity, focus groups associated with the 
Action Agenda process found that many dislocated workers face social barriers, including low 
educational attainment and literacy levels, cultural resistance to accepting public assistance or 
“welfare,” and a debilitating psychological shock from the layoff.  (Action Agenda, 22).   
 
Deindustrialization as Disaster 
 
 These statistics bear witness to Pillowtex writ large throughout North Carolina—the 
reality of deindustrialization in rural communities once heavily dependent on industries that 
macroeconomic forces have whisked away to other places on the globe, leaving these 
communities overwhelmed by the scale of the need and in desperate need of outside assistance.  
The sheer numbers of dislocated workers revealed by these statistics, the depth of their financial 
difficulties, and the immensity of the barriers hindering their return to self-sustainability virtually 
scream for a more active and visceral description of this phenomenon than the dry and scholarly 
“deindustrialization.”  Hence, many North Carolina policy makers since Pillowtex have found 
the term “economic disaster” more satisfying to convey the nature of the challenge.  Beyond 
emotional satisfaction, the use of the term “disaster” to describe the effects of deindustrialization 
reflects a changing policy consensus—embodied in the Action Agenda process—on how to help 
dislocated workers in North Carolina.  In this emerging consensus, economic disasters are seen 
as discrete events—like hurricanes, flooding, or tornadoes—that can be anticipated, and the 
consequences for workers and communities mitigated, through public policy.   
 
As a result, the Workforce Commission is working to develop policy tools to respond to 
these events, in the recognition that deindustrialization and layoffs are increasingly common in 
- 12 - 
North Carolina, as global economic restructuring continues to pressure on the state’s traditional 
core industries of tobacco, furniture, and textiles.  As these layoffs continue, the state is working 
through the Action Agenda process to foster strong policy responses, a strategy which requires a 
specific definition of what constitutes an economic disaster, beyond the simple label of “mass 
layoffs.” 
 
Defining an Economic Disaster 
 
What defines an “economic disaster?”  Various stakeholders in the Action Agenda 
process have called for a definition to be developed, but have also recognized that it is not so 
easy as setting a target number of individuals laid off or a percentage of the labor force 
unemployed through a layoff or plant closure.    
 
Out of this process, however, has emerged a clear understanding that an economic 
disaster has several elements.  First, an “economic disaster” occurs when a large number of 
workers in a community lose their jobs through no fault of their own due to layoffs, plant 
closures or other severe economic dislocations.  While there is no consensus number for the 
exact number of jobs lost necessary to constitute an economic disaster for Workforce 
Commission planning purposes, there are several different options available.  One such option 
involves the threshold set by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notice (WARN), federal 
law that requires all firm to notify the state in a WARN notice if they anticipate a layoff larger 
than 50 people within a certain period of time.  However, those firms uninterested in complying 
with the spirit of the law can simply spread out their layoffs over time to avoid triggering the 50 
person-at-a-time threshold.  Cognizant of these shortcomings, the Workforce Commission has 
pursued other numerical thresholds, including a tiered approach of pegging the extent of the 
disaster to the number of total jobs lost within a certain period.  There has also been discussion 
of setting a threshold that takes into account the number of jobs lost as a percentage of the total 
workforce in the affected region.   
 
Secondly, regardless of the exact number of workers laid off, the event must have a 
significant and negative impact on the community itself and on the lives of the dislocated 
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workers who live there.  Many communities in rural North Carolina grew up around and became 
virtually dependent on the mills and factories of the state’s industrial past.  Not only did textile 
mills like Stonecutters, Pillowtex, or VF Jeanswear employ a significant portion of a 
community’s residents, they also played a critical role as part of the community’s tax base and 
consumer of city services.  As these mills shut down and moved away, the city government left 
behind faced sudden and dramatic revenue losses just at the time when greater city resources 
would be required to address the steadily mounting needs of their increasingly desperate former 
workforce.   
 
Adding to the broader problem facing the affected community, many of the locality’s 
small businesses and secondary suppliers felt an immediate crunch as their chief source of 
business vanished.  These businesses either laid off their employees or had to close down 
themselves, further worsening the unemployment crisis facing a community.  As for dislocated 
workers themselves, the consequences of these layoffs can be absolutely devastating, financially 
and emotionally.  Many of these workers have been employed in the mill for decades and the 
prospect of finding a new job is shocking and almost inconceivable.  Many of them have only a 
high school diploma or less, lack basic literacy, and have few of the skills necessary to find a job 
in the new economy.  On top of these structural concerns, many of these workers are faced with 
sudden drops in income, as their Unemployment Benefits provide significantly less than their 
former salaries.  Mortgages, health insurance, credit card bills, and school tuition, become 
unpayable, as these workers slip further and further behind. 
 
Thirdly, the impact of the event must be so severe that they overwhelm the ability and 
resources of the local community to respond.  The Governor’s Rapid Response Team, mobilized 
when a firm submits its WARN notice, embodies the implicit recognition that local communities 
need external assistance when faced with severe layoffs.  After almost two decades of Rapid 
Response, it has become clear that the external, coordinated assistance rendered by the Rapid 
Response Team is critical to assisting impacted communities, and that the need is no less in those 
communities experiencing layoffs that have not triggered a WARN notice. 
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In light of these different elements, the Workforce Commission is moving towards 
adopting the following, more qualitative working definition that this paper also uses:  An 
economic disaster occurs when a significant proportion of the community’s workforce is laid off 
through no fault of the workers, generating a high unemployment rate, a significant loss of local 
revenue, and emergency service and workforce development needs that overwhelm local 
resources. 
 
Responding to Economic Disasters 
 
This chapter has attempted to answer the first central question posed by this project by 
defining the term “economic disaster” within a broader historical, theoretical, and policy context.  
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we can say that economic restructuring leads to the 
closures of plants historically, culturally, financially, economically, and socially at the heart of 
many rural North Carolina communities.  These closures often result in sudden surges in 
unemployment for large numbers of newly-dislocated workers, in turn quickly overwhelming the 
local ability to respond.  Beyond doubt, this constitutes a disaster, and very the use of this 
metaphor opens the possibility for different policy approaches than is typically suggested for 
responding to these Pillowtex-like disasters.  This new policy opportunity is the subject of the 
following two chapters. 
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III. The Role of Nonprofits 
 
In much of the scholarly work on deindustrialization, researchers have proposed policies 
that almost exclusively involve the actions of government.  Neil (1992) and Perrucci, Perrucci, 
Targ, & Targ (1988) provide excellent examples of public sector strategies for addressing 
deindustrialization in cases ranging across the western world, from Norwegian coal mines to 
Canadian steel mills;  Moore (1996) describes a similar, government-led effort in the United 
States; and Hathaway (1993) poses the provocative question of what dislocated workers in 
deindustrializing communities can do to respond to these closures through grassroots political 
action aimed at government action.    
 
While the government is clearly an important actor, it is important to think about other 
roles and other partnerships that can enhance the response to economic disasters.  Embodied in 
Subrecommendation 8-3 of the Action Agenda, the use of the disaster metaphor has created a 
policy context for innovative response strategies that involve a broader array of organizations 
and actors than simply just the government institutions profiled in much of the scholarly 
literature on deindustrialization.  Specifically, this new context opens the door for partnerships 
between government agencies and the vast universe of the voluntary sector, including nonprofits, 
community-based, and faith-based organizations, a partnership clearly and deliberately 
articulated in the Action Agenda and the Taskforce Policy Recommendations.  In light of this 
new context, this chapter explains why nonprofits should partner in economic disaster response, 
and then argues for the precise shape this role should take—specifically as a labor market 
intermediary between the dislocated worker and the state’s workforce development system. 
 
A Role for Nonprofits? 
 
Despite all the challenges facing dislocated workers in the aftermath of economic 
disasters, many of the rural communities they live in have an abundance of faith-based, 
community-based, and nonprofit organizations committed to meeting the needs of these workers.  
In the aftermath of hurricanes and plant closings, these nonprofit organizations (a catch-all term 
referring collectively to these different types of non-governmental organizations) have a deep 
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commitment and desire to help the people in their communities recover from such a disaster.  
Following natural disasters, these organizations have existing strategies, protocols, and 
organizational networks for engaging in disaster response and recovery efforts.  After economic 
disasters, by contrast, many nonprofits lack a clear understanding of how to help the dislocated 
workers in their communities.   
 
Frequently, these organizations need some kind of institutionalized strategy to connect 
dislocated workers to the resources they need for immediate relief and long-term recovery.  In 
the immediate aftermath of the disaster, nonprofits can provide needed financial and social 
assistance directly, or help workers access existing governmental services—Unemployment 
Insurance, Trade Adjustment Assistance, retraining assistance—to which they are entitled but 
may have little idea of how to access or secure.  Beyond short term needs, these organizations 
can also help connect dislocated workers to the workforce development and job training 
resources that will ultimately provide them with options for long-term recovery.  In both cases, 
nonprofits can play a valuable partnership role with governmental agencies by using their 
credibility and pre-existing relationships with dislocated workers to bring them into the public 
safety net designed to help them, but difficult to navigate.   
 
In rural North Carolina, many nonprofits—especially churches—have long-standing 
relationships with many of the dislocated workers in their community, a factor magnified in 
smaller, closer-knit rural areas.  This has two implications.  First, these organizations often have 
significant relational and cultural “credibility” with their dislocated customers.  For example, 
dislocated workers in tight-knit rural communities are generally comfortable going to their local 
church, or walking into the CDC that helped them buy their house, or the United Way office 
down the street that has helped them in other tight financial situations.  But due to a widely-
perceived social stigma of “welfare,” many of these workers will be less comfortable entering a 
government office that provides public assistance (Interview: Beatty, 2005; Interview: White, 
2005).  Secondly, this institutional credibility allows nonprofits to play an important role in the 
workforce system; it is the “glue” that binds workers to nonprofits that can only rarely be 
replicated when dealing with the public sector.  Because of this glue, these relationships provide 
a physical link between organized entities and dozens, perhaps, hundreds of dislocated workers 
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who are not otherwise tracked, or linked to any public agencies.  Alongside nonprofits’ well 
documented ability to deliver targeted emergency services meeting the specific needs of their 
customers (Botchwey, 2004; Couto, 1999), these relationships also allow nonprofits to act as an 
intermediary, educating workers on available resources and connecting them to the proper access 
points in the relevant public agencies.  The chief role, then, is one of helping dislocated workers 
access workforce and other services. 
 
These interlocking strengths of nonprofits have been recognized by policy makers who 
believe they can be harnessed to enhance the effectiveness of the workforce development system, 
regardless of economic disasters; this recognition provides a positive policy context for 
articulating a role for nonprofits in economic disaster response.  Indeed, interviews with major 
Workforce Commission stakeholders and nonprofit leaders alike revealed an increasing interest 
in utilizing nonprofits’ innate abilities to connect people to public training and unemployment 
resources.  For instance, Roger Shackleford, the director of the NC Workforce Commission, 
argued that nonprofits, and especially faith-based organizations, represented a critical resource 
that would define the future of effective service delivery (Interview: Shackleford, 2005); this 
view was echoed by senior officials in the Employment Security Commission (ESC) and the 
Division of Employment & Training (DET)—the major state agencies engaged in workforce 
development.  Building on these commitments, and in order to implement this vision, the NC 
Department of Commerce is pursuing two different programs to harness the assets of 
nonprofits—the Federally-funded SHARE Network, and State-initiated Community Service 
Delivery Forums.   
 
Both of these programs reinforce the general recognition of the value nonprofit 
partnerships, but it is important to remember that this commitment was first made explicit in the 
specific context of economic disasters by Subrecommendation 8-3 and Recommendation IV.7.  
As spelled out in these key policy documents, the State envisioned a role for nonprofits in 
economic disasters that is similar to the role played by VOAD in natural disasters—a role that 
builds on nonprofits’ credibility and ability to function as a bridge between workers and the 
workforce system.  In the case of VOAD, dozens or even hundreds of congregations, CBOs, and 
large nonprofits like the United Way and Red Cross pitch in to help communities recover from 
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natural disasters, doing everything from canned food drives, shelters, and monetary assistance to 
working with FEMA to identify affected neighborhoods.  Coupled with the sheer number of 
nonprofits involved, the organizational complexity of disaster response efforts requires some 
kind of entity to manage all of the moving pieces involved in the response, and VOAD has 
traditionally filled this role following natural disasters—especially hurricanes—in North 
Carolina.  In the case of economic disasters, just as VOAD manages nonprofit activities 
following natural disasters, there is a similar need for some kind of entity that manages the 
nonprofit activities engaging involved in responding to mass layoffs and other economic 
dislocations—especially the long-term recovery issue of connecting dislocated workers to 
services available through the state’s workforce development system.   
 
How can nonprofits play such a role?  Using a brief discussion of relevant scholarly 
literature, the rest of this chapter will answer this question by arguing that nonprofits can 
function as intermediaries in the labor market, connecting dislocated workers to the job-
retraining resources they need for long-term recovery.  Specifically, nonprofits can network 
together and create a “space for conversation” that allows nonprofits and dislocated workers to 
learn about, connect with, and respond to the services offered by the workforce system and other 
nonprofits. 
 
Labor Market Intermediaries and the Role of Nonprofits 
 
 When economic disasters strike a community, the labor market fragmentation endemic to 
the post-industrial American economy (Giloth, 1998) becomes even more acute.  Most dislocated 
workers in rural communities are largely unskilled and lack the adequate education and training 
to market themselves to prospective “New Economy” employers.  (Action Agenda, 8).  By the 
same token, potential employers are less willing to start a new business or locate in a state 
without an adequate supply of relevantly skilled labor.  As is often the case with 
deindustrialization, communities hit with economic disasters face a troubling disconnect between 
the kind of labor a firm needs and the type of labor the community (and the worker himself) is 
offering. 
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Originally developed to address this labor market fragmentation, the concept of the labor 
market intermediary is especially relevant in bridging this troubling post-disaster disconnect.   
Labor Market Intermediaries are public, private, or nonprofit agencies that broker the 
relationship between workers and employers, reduce transaction costs for employers and 
potential employees, and shape relational and organizational “networks” for employers and 
workers. (Benner, 2003).  The North Carolina Workforce system is an example of a public labor 
market intermediary that attempts to provide workers with the skills they need to be competitive 
in seeking employment by firms. 
 
As previously discussed, the state’s workforce does system offer significant opportunities 
for retraining but many dislocated workers are simply unaware of these resources, and those who 
are aware may face cultural and economic barriers in taking advantage of them.  Indeed, 
Workforce Commission Director Roger Shackleford has identified this gap between the labor 
market intermediary and the workforce development system as the chief challenge facing his 
Commission; in the Action Agenda and in personal interviews he has recommended that 
nonprofit and faith-based organizations should play a critical role in bridging this disconnect.  In 
effect, then, this policy recommendation calls for nonprofit organizations to function as a 
supporting labor market intermediary, working to improve the effectiveness of the state-led labor 
market intermediary. 
 
 Perhaps the most critical role played by nonprofits in the context of the state’s workforce 
system involves their ability to reduce transaction costs.  Defined by Williamson (1981) as the 
“economic counterpoint of friction,” transaction costs are normally studied in the context of 
market activity.  Do interactions between firms along a supply chain occur harmoniously, or are 
there miscommunications, information gaps, and other conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns, 
and other malfunctions?  (Williamson, 1981).  While the transaction cost approach traditionally 
involves market space and the interaction of firms, it is also possible to extend the concept of 
transaction costs to the explicitly non-market “public space” created by government and 
nonprofit institutions.  According to traditional models of cluster theory (Porter, 1998), firms 
need labor market intermediaries to reduce the transaction costs associated with finding, hiring, 
and training new employees in the highly fragmented global economy (Giloth).   
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 Just as the firm faces significant transaction costs in cases of market fragmentation, 
governmental institutions and nonprofit organization also experience significant transaction costs 
in situations with high levels of social fragmentation and policy disconnect—especially in 
situations of economic disaster.  Going further with this analogy and rephrasing Williamson’s 
question along these lines, the question becomes, do interactions between workforce 
development agencies and their intended customers occur harmoniously, or are their 
miscommunications, information gaps, and other conflicts that prevent dislocated workers from 
accessing and utilizing their programs, from Unemployment Insurance to job retraining?  The 
gaps and disconnects represent “friction in service delivery.”  In the case of workforce 
development, the very existence of nonprofit labor market intermediaries speaks to the inability 
of government job training programs to reach a sufficient number of potential workers, and the 
all-too-common failure to provide the types of training needed by firms.  In other words, the very 
need for nonprofit intermediaries speaks to the existence of prohibitive “friction.” 
 
In the case of economic disasters, transaction costs manifest themselves for both 
dislocated workers and nonprofits as a lack of information and a lack of capacity to adequately 
respond.  As previously discussed, once they are laid off, dislocated workers face crippling 
“costs” in obtaining the resources they need for immediate relief and long-term recovery.  First, 
they lack information about services, and especially about retraining—the key to long-term 
recovery.  Secondly, they often lack basic capacity—literacy, job-finding skills, etc.  
Additionally, nonprofits also experience similar transaction costs.  They often lack information 
about the available resources offered through other nonprofits and the state’s workforce system.   
(Interview: White, 2006).  Similarly, in terms of capacity, nonprofits often lack the specialized 
knowledge about specific needs of dislocated workers. 
 
Using nonprofits to play the role of a supporting labor market intermediary within the 
state’s workforce system can overcome all of these transaction costs and “friction” through the 
power of “networking” together various institutional actors in ways that build capacity and 
provide better information.  The ideal result is that dislocated workers gain the training they need 
to compete for the jobs for which firms are hiring.  Ultimately, then, this kind of networking 
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fulfills the archetypal definition of a labor market intermediary as an organization that makes it 
easier for firms to connect with labor and provides an excellent conceptual framework for 
approaching the call of the Action Agenda and Policy Recommendations.   
 
Taking this one step further opens up the question of why nonprofits in particular have 
the ability to play this role.  Based on another extension of cluster theory, it can be argued that 
nonprofits can overcome these transaction costs in the same way that firms use clusters to create 
the “conversational space” necessary for innovation (Piore, 1995, 2004).  Networking nonprofits 
together with each other and with the state workforce system creates the conversational space 
within the network and within each nonprofit’s service provision circle for coordinating response 
efforts and allowing information, capacity, and strategic planning to flow freely.  In turn, this 
strengthens the nonprofits’ ability to provide services and connect dislocated workers to the 
workforce system; it enhances the ability of the workforce system to reach dislocated workers 
with needed training resources; and finally it improves access for dislocated workers to resources 
needed for short-term relief and long-term recovery.   
 
Implications for Policy 
 
This chapter has attempted to answer the second central question posed by this project—
the role nonprofits can play in responding to economic disasters—by first discussing the cultural 
and relational credibility that make nonprofits a recognized and valuable partner with the state’s 
workforce development system, and then by articulating the precise shape this role should take.  
The interaction of these different concepts provides several policy implications essential for the 
program development of Resources to Recover.  They include: 
 
• By harnessing the recognized strengths of nonprofits as partners with the public sector, 
institutionalized networks of nonprofits can act as labor market intermediaries that 
connect organizations to each other and dislocated workers to the workforce development 
system.   
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• These institutionalized networks create a “space for conversation” that allows nonprofits 
and dislocated workers to learn about, connect with, and respond to the services offered 
by the workforce development system and other nonprofits.  In the aftermath of economic 
disasters, this conversational space also creates the vehicle for disaster response 
coordination and strategic planning.  
 
• Such a role will reduce “friction”—the gaps and disconnects in the delivery of retraining 
and up-skilling services—greatly helping dislocated workers overcome the substantial 
hurdles to receiving assistance on their way to long-term recovery. 
 
Having defined a largely theoretical role for nonprofits, it is critical now to turn to the 
more concrete question of how to translate this concept into reality.  The ultimate goal of this 
paper is to develop Resources to Recover, a collaborative, public-private partnership that 
mobilizes North Carolina’s nonprofit organizations to act as labor market intermediaries, 
connecting dislocated workers with the workforce development resources they need to recover 
from economic disasters.  The remaining chapters of this paper are largely concerned with this 
task, beginning with an analysis of the Community Service Center (CSC), a nonprofit 
intermediary organized in response to the Pillowtex closings. 
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IV.  Pillowtex and the Community Service Center 
 
As previously discussed, the Pillowtex closure in Kannapolis represented the first 
explicitly recognized “economic disaster.”  The magnitude of the layoff—the largest in state 
history—gave rise to a number of unprecedented response efforts, including the formation of the 
Community Service Center (CSC), an institutionalized nonprofit collaborative that acted as an 
intermediary between dislocated workers and various government agencies.  As the only known 
example of such a coordinated nonprofit response to economic disasters, the CSC provides 
several important lessons for developing R2R to address a dramatically different environment 
than what existed in Kannapolis in 2003. 
 
Nonprofits and Disaster Response in Kannapolis 
 
Faced with a closure of historic, almost epic proportions, that clearly overwhelmed local 
needs, leaders at the Federal, state, and local levels worked together in the glare of state and 
national media attention to provide critical retraining services, direct financial support, and 
critical special initiatives (including the negotiation of a special health insurance plan with Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield) to workers laid off from Pillowtex.  Such was the State commitment to this 
effort that the DET set up a mobile JobLink (the State’s one-stop shop for the delivery of 
workforce development services) site in Plant 4, the largest Pillowtex facility.  Aside from 
providing dislocated workers with information on retraining, this site also allowed workers to 
access the equally bewildering universe of workforce development and unemployment resources 
all at one time.  
 
In a similar effort, a loose network of local nonprofits and faith-based organizations 
worked in concert with these public agencies to mobilize an unprecedented and coordinated 
human service delivery effort to meet the needs of dislocated workers (Beatty, 2004).  Prior to 
the closure, the Cabarrus County Department of Social Services and the local United Way office 
helped assemble this ad hoc group and began planning as early as March for a coordinated 
human and social service delivery strategy to help the soon-to-be dislocated workers get the 
maximum assistance in the most efficient manner possible.  In the month following the closure, 
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this ad hoc group quickly evolved into the Community Service Center, a formal 501c3 
organization.  In interviews, several of those involved pointed to these preliminary discussions as 
critically important in the CSC’s success. 
 
Legally established on August 4, and housed in Kimball Memorial Lutheran Church 
(literally down the block from Plant 4), this institutionalized “space for conversation” served as a 
one-stop shop that helped 1200 dislocated workers access the bewildering array of available 
human services in an environment more culturally comfortable them than the local welfare 
office.  Acting as a labor market intermediary, this center also actively pushed dislocated 
workers to the workforce system’s counterpart in Plant 4.  Post-disaster assessments have 
indicated that this “networked” approach allowed for information to be coherently disseminated 
to all 4800 dislocated workers, quickly connecting them to the workforce development system, 
which in turn helped prepare almost 2000 workers for the types of jobs required by local and 
regional firms (Beatty, 2004).  While the long-term success of the actual retraining efforts 
remains to be seen, this case clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of nonprofits acting as labor 
market intermediaries in referring workers to the workforce system.  This is the hope embodied 
in the Action Agenda’s call for R2R.  
 
Implications for Policy 
 
As the only known example of a nonprofit intermediary, and in the defining economic 
disaster of this generation, the Pillowtex experience as a whole and the CSC in particular offer 
several important implications for the policy development of R2R.  First, pre-event planning 
proved vital to establishing a common framework for effective response following the disaster, 
and especially for connecting nonprofits to each other, to dislocated workers, and to the 
workforce system.  As warning signs of the impending closure began to mount, the ad hoc group 
of nonprofit leaders and state administrators were able to begin developing strategic response 
plans, referral protocols, and the organizational framework for what became the CSC.  Indeed, 
the very day Pillowtex announced the closure, members of the ad hoc group walked into the 
private Cannon Foundation, presented its plans, and secured a $750,000 grant to fund CSC 
operations  (Interview: Mack, 2006).  Without this extended space for conversation, several key 
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stakeholders made it clear that the CSC could never have opened its doors only four days after 
the closing and put in place the relevant strategies for helping the thousands of dislocated 
workers with their various needs and program eligibilities (Beatty, 2004; Interview: Beatty, 
2006; Interview: Mack, 2006; Interview: Hollars, 2006).   
 
Secondly, coordination between state agencies and nonprofits helped provide dislocated 
workers with the specific services they needed while minimizing gaps or overlaps in service 
delivery.  One-stop sites like the CSC at the Lutheran Church and the mobile JobLink site at 
Plant 4 proved very effective in helping dislocated workers access the Federal, State, and 
community-based resources that already exist, but may be confusing or even unknown to these 
workers.  Even more critically, the leaders, institutions, and organizations involved in both of 
these approaches experienced a high degree of interactivity, as seen in the public-private 
partnership style of planning for the CSC, the mutual referrals between the CSC and Plant 4, and 
the willingness of the Rapid Response Team to shape strategy based on needs expressed by the 
CSC and other community leaders.  In other words, these arrangements institutionalized the 
interactivity so essential for effective coordination; in effect, they represented important 
conversational space for planning, coordination, and coherent service delivery, and so provides a 
useful model for developing a nonprofit labor market intermediary.  
 
 Both of these strengths reflect some of the unique aspects of the Pillowtex experience that 
may not be automatically transferable to other communities suffering from economic disasters.  
Indeed, one can argue from this case that the very rootedness of Pillowtex in the community 
fabric that generated such catastrophic effects also provided a foundation or a rallying point for 
successful response and recovery.  Interviews revealed that the deep interrelationships between 
the iconic mill and the town fostered an abiding sense of “togetherness” that fueled an 
innovative, integrated response by the area’s nonprofits.   While much of this “togetherness” 
reflected the historical importance of this particular mill to this particular town, other mills with 
similarly ancestral roots in North Carolina’s rural communities (Stonecutter’s Mill in Spindale, 
for example) have experienced economic disasters without developing the type of networked 
response program that operated so effectively in Kannapolis.  Indeed, the very absence of CSC-
type efforts in these communities bolsters the reasoning behind Subrecommendation 8-3 and 
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Policy Recommendation IV.7.  If nonprofits in every community responded to economic disaster 
in the same way as in Kannapolis, then there would likely be significantly less need for an 
“economic VOAD.”  However, since such an integrated nonprofit response program has not 
emerged organically in these communities, it becomes even more important to create such an 
entity through the organizational planning and institutional networking envisioned by the Action 
Agenda. 
 
A second unique aspect with profound implications for R2R involves the fact that the 
Pillowtex response took place amidst intense public awareness of the “largest layoff in state 
history,” a context unlikely to be repeated in other less-publicized and less remarkable, though 
obviously no less destructive, economic disasters.  In the case of Pillowtex, the magnitude of the 
disaster generated national and even international media attention, captured the imagination of 
thousands North Carolinas (many of whom donated goods and contributed financially to various 
charitable Pillowtex Relief Funds), and spawned countless speeches, policy proposals, and press 
conferences by political officials throughout the state.  This heightened public awareness made it 
much easier for the local community to access financial resources and obtain the special 
governmental assistance (like the JobLink in Plant 4) that proved so critical in the Pillowtex 
response efforts.   
 
Because mass layoffs have become almost routine, however, senior workforce 
development officials fear that economic disaster responders in the post-Pillowtex world likely 
cannot count on anywhere near the same widespread level of public attention and political 
interest that mobilized so many resources to assist Cabarrus County in 2003 (Interview: 
Shackleford, 2006; Interview: White, 2006).  Indeed, the VF Jeans plant in nearby Bertie County 
closed down shortly after Pillowtex, causing a similar amount of economic and social turmoil; 
yet, this smaller community did not attract the same level of attention and assistance (Action 
Agenda, 26; Interview: Beatty, 2006).  In the years since, just as New Orleans’ Lower Ninth 
Ward seems to have slowly slipped out of the national consciousness two years after Hurricane 
Katrina, so have these layoffs become such a regular occurrence four years after Pillowtex that 
they no longer capture the public imagination, and as a result, no longer generate the same levels 
of outside assistance.  Fortunately, as anticipated by the Action Agenda, institutionalized 
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networks of relationships between nonprofits and the workforce system can counteract these 
negative consequence by ensuring that the conversational space for planning, coordination, and 
service delivery that arose organically in Kannapolis will already exist in communities before 
disasters strike.  
  
 In summary, each of these implications provides direct guidance for the development of 
R2R.  First, advance planning matters.  In light of the success of the CSC, R2R should 
incorporate strategic planning in advance of disasters to ensure that nonprofits can respond more 
rapidly and efficiently in their aftermath.  Clearly, it is impossible to predict when or if a mass 
layoff will occur, so the planning aspect becomes even more important in light of this 
uncertainty.  A second, related lesson, involves the importance of conversational space that arose 
from this planning; R2R needs to institutionalize regular opportunities for planning, 
coordination, and information sharing between its members.  Finally, the program design of R2R 
should reflect the type of institutionalized networking and interactivity between nonprofits and 
state agencies embodied in the protocols and referral system utilized by the CSC.  Just as the 
CSC operated as a labor market intermediary, so should R2R.   
 
Although Pillowtex provides perhaps the greatest example of a nonprofit intermediary 
specifically addressing economic disasters, there are several other models currently operating in 
North Carolina that seek to partner with nonprofits to improve coordination and delivery of 
services.  Each of these models also provides useful lessons for developing R2R. 
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V. Sharpening the Focus: Other Models 
 
 The ultimate goal of this project is to develop Resources to Recover, a collaborative, 
public-private partnership that mobilizes North Carolina’s nonprofit organizations to act as labor 
market intermediaries, connecting dislocated workers with the workforce development resources 
they need to recover from economic disasters.  In order to fully develop this program, it is 
important to consider the broader landscape of the State’s workforce development system, as 
well as several specific examples of partnership between the workforce system and nonprofits.  
Both aspects provide useful context and important lessons for the design and operation of R2R.  
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into two parts.  The first part begins by examining the 
overarching policy approaches and institutions involved in the State’s workforce development 
system; the second part then turns to analyzing three examples of partnerships between 
nonprofits and state agencies, with an eye to the broader context of economic disasters, labor 
market intermediaries, and conversational space.  These other models include: 
 
• CARELine, administered by the NC Department of Health and Human Services; 
• Community Service Delivery Forums, organized by Workforce Commission staff; 
• Sharing How Access to Resources Empowers (SHARE) Network, administered by the 
Division of Employment & Training; 
 
Workforce Development in North Carolina 
 
Along with R2R, each of these models is directly shaped by the institutional landscape of 
the State’s workforce development system, and it is impossible to properly assess their relevance 
for R2R without understanding this environment.  The first important element in this 
environment involves two overarching policy approaches to providing workforce development 
resources to dislocated workers and other interested customers.  These approaches are embedded 
in the guidelines set out in the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), which states must 
follow in order to receive WIA funds, and include the following:   
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• No wrong doors.  This approach ensures that whatever “door” or organization a 
customer walks through, he will have access to the relevant information he needs to 
secure services.  This includes contact information for relevant agencies, referral 
paperwork, and eligibility requirements for relevant services.  In using a “no wrong 
doors” approach, the state’s workforce system is specifically harnessing the strengths of 
nonprofits—community credibility and pre-existing relationships—to achieve its goals.  
An additional positive aspect of this approach involves the cost efficiency of allowing 
smaller organizations with narrower, more targeted missions, in remote geographic areas 
to participate without sacrificing the breadth of resources made available through 
referrals. 
 
• One-stop Shop.  The One-Stop Shop concept seeks to reduce organizational and 
personal transaction costs by ensuring that customers can walk into one site and access all 
of the services they require at one time, in this one location.  The goal is to reduce the 
time spent by customers traveling to and from different locations in search of different 
services; it also seeks to make the available services more comprehensible and more 
accessible for dislocated workers who often face literacy-related and cultural challenges 
in accessing the workforce system. 
 
In turn, these policy approaches shape the second element of the institutional 
environment—the nature, roles, and interactions of the various agencies involved in North 
Carolina’s workforce development system.  These agencies include: 
 
• The NC Workforce Commission.  Technically under the jurisdiction of the Department 
of Commerce, the Commission is the chief interagency coordinating and policy body that 
oversees the various workforce development activities carried out by different agencies 
across state government.  Directed by Roger Shackelford, the Commission has its own 
staff members, each of whom heads up several policy committees, including the Policy 
Research and Assessment Committee (which produced Recommendation IV.7) and the 
Dislocated Worker Taskforce (involved in producing the Action Agenda and 
Subrecommendation 8-3).  Once committee or task force recommendations are adopted 
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by the entire Commission, they are considered official policy of the state government.  In 
effect, the Commission is responsible for ensuring the state-run LMI is as effective as 
possible. 
 
• Local Workforce Areas.  In order to meet WIA compliance standards, each state is 
required to set up local Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) in order to implementing 
workforce development policy at the local level.  In North Carolina, there are 24 Local 
Workforce Areas, and they are responsible for administering job-training assistance to 
local workers through programming, partnerships, and operation of the JobLinks (see 
below) under their jurisdiction.  Under new chartering rules issued in 2004, each Local 
Area in the state is also explicitly encouraged to develop partnerships with local 
nonprofits in order to increase availability and access to workforce development services, 
usually through a no-wrong doors approach. 
 
• JobLink.  Additional WIA compliance standards require that each WIB provide one-stop 
shops where customers can access the entire universe of Federal workforce development 
resources, unemployment benefits, and social services in one location.  In North Carolina, 
the JobLink fills this role, with at least one location in every county.  As a result, JobLink 
has been considered the primary LMI for delivering these services to dislocated workers 
throughout the state.  
 
• Division of Employment & Training (DET).  A division of the NC Department of 
Commerce, DET administers the state-level workforce development policies proposed by 
the Workforce Commission, manages the Local Workforce Areas, and ensures their 
general compliance with WIA regulations.  DET also administers the overwhelming 
majority of the state’s JobLinks, thus playing a key role in the state-run LMI. 
 
• Employment Security Commission (ESC).  A stand-alone commission within the NC 
Department of Commerce, the ESC administers the Federal Unemployment Insurance 
program (UI), the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program specifically for 
dislocated workers, and several JobLink facilities (although these are currently being 
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consolidated by the Commission).  When dislocated workers lose their jobs in economic 
disasters, they are almost always entitled to UI benefits for a given period, and in many 
cases for additional financial assistance through the TAA program, since their job-loss 
was related to international trade.  Securing these benefits is usually the first critical task 
facing dislocated workers upon losing their job, and the complexity of the paperwork and 
eligibility requirements has often proved prohibitive for many of these workers—hence 
the need for “one-stop shops” and “no wrong doors” to reduce complexity, time, and 
effort for these workers.  
 
• Rapid Response Team.  Operated out of the Governor’s office, the Rapid Response 
Team is the primary vehicle for mobilizing and coordinating the response of all of the 
preceding state agencies in the event of a plant closure that triggers a WARN notice.  The 
Rapid Response Team meets in the impacted area and consists of local and state 
representatives from relevant agencies, including nonprofits and congregations.   
 
This web of approaches, agencies, and programs creates the institutional landscape that 
frames various efforts by North Carolina’s state government to partner with nonprofit 
organizations to enhance the delivery of workforce system resources and services.  Within this 
policy context, it is now possible to examine several of these efforts in greater detail, with an eye 
to extracting lessons for the policy development of R2R.  In progressively sharper focus, the 
following examples provide increasingly useful models of how nonprofit LMIs can connect 
people to government services and create the conversational space necessary for successful 
economic disaster response planning and response. 
 
Community Service Delivery Forums 
 
Developed in the aftermath of Pillowtex by the Workforce Commission staff, Community 
Service Delivery Forums provide a useful “first cut” at involving nonprofits in partnership with 
the workforce system, but one that lacks sufficient conversational space for planning.  In these 
forums, the Workforce Commission staff hold educational forums for nonprofit, faith-based, and 
community-based organizations to learn about the workforce development services offered by 
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JobLink, the ESC, and the DET.  At their core, these forums are essentially briefings for 
nonprofits that can reduce their transaction costs in dealing with the workforce development 
system.  With accurate information, nonprofits can function in a no-wrong doors capacity and 
more quickly refer their customers to the relevant resources and agencies.  
 
Despite these obvious strengths, there are still are several missing pieces to Service 
Delivery Forums that reduce their effectiveness in converting nonprofits to labor market 
intermediaries.  Most importantly, these briefing create no conversational space for active 
planning, referrals, or action.  As a result, there is no institutionalized vehicle to coordinate 
nonprofit responses to economic disasters, or to measure and compare how nonprofits are using 
the information provided to serve their customers.  Accordingly, these briefings are useful as a 
small piece in a larger, more comprehensive strategy to network nonprofits and create 
conversational space for strategic planning and coordination before, during, and after economic 
disasters—the nonprofit LMI envisioned by the Action Agenda as an “economic VOAD” and the 




At first glance, it appears that the CareLine program has the most tenuous connection to 
workforce development of any of these models, and it almost certainly cannot claim to act as a 
labor market intermediary.  Administered by the  Office of Citizen Services in the NC 
Department Health and Human Services (DHHS)—and not by any of the relevant workforce 
development agencies—the CareLine provides a 1-800 telephone number to a comprehensive 
information and referral line available throughout NC line that connects people to relevant social 
services based on their need.  Historically, the line has targeted elderly and special needs 
populations and has received over 200,000 calls a year, largely focusing on Medicaid and 
immediate human service needs like food, shelter, and power (Interview: Raby, 2005). 
 
Despite the social and human services focus however, the CareLine provides a helpful 
model for creating a nonprofit LMI both as an example of how to connect with nonprofits and a 
possible partner for an operational R2R.  First, with its database of state caseworkers and over 
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9,000 nonprofits throughout the state (Ibid.), the CareLine demonstrates the strengths of a one-
stop shop referral system built on the foundation of up-to date contact lists—a major challenge in 
a state with an ever-changing list of over 40,000 nonprofits (Interview: Schofield, 2006).  For 
instance, if someone called into the CareLine from Asheville in need of social services, a 
Referral Specialist could give them the contact information for the local Social Services office in 
Buncombe, along with suggestions for local nonprofits that cold help meet the specifics needs of 
the caller.  In doing so the CareLine provides an excellent example of an intermediary between 
people and agencies, and illustrates a straightforward method of integrating nonprofits into 
existing service delivery networks.  As such, it represents a first step to the type of nonprofit 
LMI envisioned by the Action Agenda, if properly combined with some form of conversational 
space for planning and coordination. 
 
Secondly, CareLine represents a potential partner for the type of LMI envisioned in the 
program development of R2R.  At the time of this writing, DHHS is preparing a web-based 
version of CareLink called CareLink that is intended to act as a no-wrong doors approach to 
providing people with services (albeit at this point, mostly social services unrelated to the 
workforce system).  In its current form, CareLink is envisioned as a web-based Web-based portal 
and searchable database of organization and resources, which participating nonprofits could offer 
their customers.  As the program proceeds, DHHS will recruit certain organizations to serve as 
geographic hubs for the participating nonprofits in a several-county footprint.  CareLink will 
then provide each of these hubs with a special tracking and case management component that 
will allow participating organizations to update their databases and case files electronically and 
in a manner accessible by other nonprofits (subject to privacy constraints), offering seamless 
tracking and accurate contact information for assisting customers.   
 
In developing a nonprofit LMI, the CareLink, or a similar system, would provide the 
technological vehicle to allow nonprofits to track dislocated workers, manage their cases, and 
direct them to the appropriate location for the services they need based on where they had been 
before.  As this shows, the partnership opportunities are real, but they also present the possibility 
of an unnecessary duplication of services with another model used to involve nonprofits in 
partnerships with government agencies: the SHARE Network. 
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 SHARE Network 
 
Initiated in 2005 as a pilot program by the Division of Employment and Training, the 
SHARE Network explicitly seeks to use nonprofits as labor market intermediaries by offering a 
no-wrong doors approach to connecting workers (including dislocated workers) to the job 
training and employment opportunities they need.  As such, it provides another step closer to the 
type of nonprofit LMI, the “economic VOAD” envisioned by the Action Agenda. 
 
To summarize the program, the SHARE Network partners with nonprofits, faith-based 
and community-based organizations by providing a computer-based access point for dislocated 
workers to connect with the services offered by the workforce system and other participating 
nonprofits.  In order to develop these partnerships, each local workforce board is responsible for 
conducting the necessary outreach throughout the target communities.  To participate, nonprofits 
must have a specified amount of physical space for hosting a computer that can be accessed by 
customers, along with an internet connection.  Once they agree to participate, each nonprofit is 
then connected to a web-based portal similar in concept to CareLink, in which the customer is 
asked a series of questions about their needs, their situation, and their interests.  Based on the 
customer’s answers to these questions, the web portal helps determine their program eligibility 
(UI, TAA, training assistance, TANF, etc) and then provides them with the appropriate contact 
information for the relevant governmental agency or nonprofit.  In combining nonprofit 
partnerships with computer-based information sharing, the SHARE Network represents a classic 
“no-wrong doors” approach; it allows customers to receive the particular services they need from 
the first organization they walk into, but then also allows them to access information about what 
else they might need and where they should go to receive these additional services. 
 
At first glance, SHARE Network appears to represent a duplication of services, not just 
with the new CareLink, but also with the Action Agenda’s proposed VOAD for economic 
disasters; indeed, it appears as though the DE&T pursued the Federal grant that funds the 
SHARE Network around the same time that the Action Agenda stakeholders (which included 
DET staff) were finalizing their recommendation for an “economic VOAD.”  Increasing the 
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complexity, DHHS began pursuing the CareLink web-portal unbeknownst to anyone in the 
workforce system and at the same time that DET began piloting SHARE Network.  According to 
staff in the DET, Workforce Commission, and DHHS, this strange duplication of efforts simply 
represented a case of government agencies’ right hands not knowing what their left hands were 
doing—a not uncommon event in large bureaucracies with multiple divisions in search of high-
profile funding opportunities.  During interviews, senior officials in DET expressed at great 
length that the SHARE Network program was not intended to supplant the work of the Action 
Agenda, or in any way express a lack of commitment to the Agenda’s policy recommendations.  
Officials in DHHS expressed similar sentiments (Interview: Beale, 2006; SHARE Meeting 
Notes, 2006).  To the contrary, in fact, all of these officials saw an opportunity for synergy 
between an economic VOAD, CareLink, and SHARE Network less than an unnecessary 
duplication of services. 
 
What would these synergies look like, and what implications would they have for 
developing R2R?  First, the fact that SHARE is in its demonstration phase opens up several 
interesting opportunities for R2R.  Because the pilot program’s funding is not permanent, the 
program itself may not become permanent.  Developing an economic VOAD alongside SHARE 
creates a greater “safety net” for nonprofit intermediaries should the US Department of Labor 
refuse to grant the necessary additional funding to expand the program or make it permanent.  In 
other words, nonprofits would still have institutionalized opportunities to connect with the 
workforce system should the SHARE Network vanish due to lack of funding.  Additionally, 
because the demonstration projects are only taking place in three Local Areas, the program 
currently lacks effective statewide reach.  As a result, even if funding continues, an economic 
VOAD is necessary in those local workforce areas where SHARE lacks a presence.   
 
In a second potential area of synergy, discussions are currently underway between web 
programmers and database administrators in DHHS and DET about ways to integrate the 
CareLink and the SHARE web portals.  If technically feasible, it is hoped that both programs 
would use the same web portal for their programs—reducing duplication, organizational 
transaction costs, and creating significantly smoother service delivery opportunities for 
nonprofits.  One final potential synergy highlights the powerful outreach, networking, and 
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service delivery capabilities in the type of nonprofit LMI proposed by the Action Agenda.  In 
interviews, senior DET and ESC officials have broached the hypothetical possibility of 
combining an economic VOAD with the SHARE Network, harnessing together the strengths of 
both approaches.  Along this line of thinking, in some form or fashion yet to be determined, an 
economic VOAD would conduct outreach and build organizational linkages, while the workforce 
board would provide the web-based portal and direct relationships to the workforce system.  
(White: Interview, 2006; Hollars: Interview, 2006; SHARE Meeting Notes, 2006).   
 
Aside from these potential synergies, it is worth examining the extent to which the 
SHARE Network provides a useful model for the program development of R2R.  Perhaps most 
critically, the SHARE Network approach unquestionably reaffirms the viability of 
institutionalizing networks of nonprofits to act as LMIs, using their credibility and relational 
history to connect workers to job-training resources and employment opportunities.  The web-
portals, guided questions, and instant referrals clearly have the potential to reduce the transaction 
costs facing dislocated workers as they attempt to access workforce system resources.  When it 
comes to connecting with the workforce system in this model, nonprofits have their own 
transaction costs reduced through the institutional linkages to the local workforce board that 
make it easier to learn about and harness available workforce services.  This is an important 
aspect of the advantages to nonprofit LMIs as envisioned by the Action Agenda.  
 
Additionally, the SHARE Network is an important compliment to the state’s existing 
workforce system and the program development of R2R.  Indeed, the program’s web-based 
portal offers an excellent administrative mechanism to track dislocated workers, manage their 
cases, and assist in referrals; this administrative component has the potential to greatly improve 
the planning and organizational management mission of R2R in two ways.  First, from the 
standpoint of nonprofits, this tracking system can seamlessly provide timely, case-specific 
information essential for rapid response to economic disasters.  Secondly, the “no wrong doors” 
approach is especially helpful for dislocated workers who otherwise face significant transaction 
costs in securing services from multiple agencies.  Taken as a lesson from these advantages, R2R 
should attempt to couple such a tracking and referral system with a “no wrong doors” 
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approach—in effect ensuring that nonprofits have the institutional linkages to pass along the 
correct information about the most appropriate services to the dislocated workers who come in.  
 
Despite these strengths, however, the SHARE Network has a fundamental weakness.  
The SHARE Network approach is limited by the lack conversational space so important to the 
strategic planning and management role envisioned by the Action Agenda for a coordinated 
nonprofit response to economic disasters.  Because the local workforce board dictates the nature 
and scope of nonprofit involvement with the workforce system, this model merely uses 
nonprofits for outreach and the delivery of information about available services.  In effect, 
nonprofits serve for the most part as terminals connected to a database managed by the local 
workforce board, rather than an institutionalized coordinating body—the “economic VOAD” 
recommended by the Action Agenda.  In order to embody this recommendation, R2R should 
extract the lesson that institutionalized relationships and networks do not automatically or 
necessarily create conversational space for planning; instead, this space must be consciously 




 In progressively stronger terms, these three models have provided valuable lessons and 
context for developing the type of nonprofit LMI envisioned by the Action Agenda to provide 
coordination and strategic planning during economic disasters.  Building on these lessons, the 
next chapter examines the example of NC Volunteers Active in Disasters (NC VOAD), the 
natural disaster response organization recommended as a model by the Action Agenda, and 
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VI.  A Nonprofit Response to Economic Disasters:  
The Resources to Recover Initiative 
 
As seen in the Pillowtex example, nonprofits can play a critical role as labor market 
intermediaries, connecting dislocated workers to the workforce development resources they need 
for long-term recovery from economic disasters.  Building on these historical, theoretical, and 
policy themes, this chapter now turns to outlining the specific program model known as 
Resources to Recover—the “economic VOAD” envisioned by the Action Agenda.  Using NC 
VOAD as a natural starting point, this program outline will reflect the lessons of Pillowtex and 
the importance of using conversational space to promote planning, coordination, and service 
delivery among nonprofits acting as labor market intermediaries. 
 
NC VOAD: A Natural Disaster Response Model 
 
In explicitly calling for an “economic VOAD,” the stakeholders in the Action Agenda 
process recognized the important role played by NC VOAD in natural disaster response, and as 
such, saw the organization as a natural model for developing a nonprofit response program for 
economic disasters.  In essence, NC VOAD functions as an intermediary at both the state and 
local levels between the state’s Department of Emergency Management (DEM) and the legions 
of nonprofits and congregations involved in disaster response.  The state chapter of a broader 
national umbrella organization formed in aftermath of Hurricane Camille, NC VOAD manages 
the disaster relief and response activities of its several thousand members; it does not deliver any 
relief services directly, but rather coordinates the service delivery activities of its members.  
Organizationally, NC VOAD exists as a 501(c)3 nonprofit that maintains lists of dues-paying 
members across the state interested in disaster response.  Tightly integrated into the state’s 
disaster response system, the organization sits on the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) 
that plans and coordinates the State’s disaster response strategy, much as the Governor’s Rapid 
Response Team coordinates several types of economic disasters. 
 
At its heart, NC VOAD provides conversational space for disaster response planning and 
coordination through holding regular meetings with its member organizations and DEM liaisons.  
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Strengthened by its integration into the state’s disaster response agencies, this regular 
conversational space ensures a minimal amount of organizational friction when disasters actually 
strike.  During and after a natural disaster, NC VOAD convenes a Recovery Coordination 
Committee (RCC) in the impacted area to coordinate local nonprofit response.  This committee 
consists of local nonprofits, congregations, and the local chapters of most major relief 
organizations like the Red Cross and United Way; these local chapters are mobilized after a 
disaster declaration by their state-level offices, which attend the regular NC VOAD meetings and 
participate in SERT.  In the months following a disaster, the RCC will evolve into a Long-Term 
Recovery Committee, which, as its name suggests, will coordinate the local recovery efforts of 
local nonprofits through regular situation briefings and decision meetings.   
 
Despite certain differences between natural disasters and economic disasters, the VOAD 
for natural disasters provides a useful model for beginning to conceptualize an “economic 
VOAD.”  In the terms repeatedly used in this paper, NC VOAD offers two key lessons to the 
development of the proposed nonprofit labor market intermediary for economic disasters.  First, 
NC VOAD’s direct integration into the state’s emergency response system allows for both 
nonprofits and government agencies to respond together seamlessly and in concert when 
disasters strike, thus reducing organizational transaction costs.  Secondly, through regular 
meetings at the state and local levels, the natural disaster program has institutionalized the 
conversation space so critical for the coordination and strategic planning essential for disaster 
response.  Accordingly, R2R should incorporate both of these organizational strengths in its 
program design. 
 
Introducing Resources to Recover 
 
Using Pillowtex and NC VOAD as conceptual guides, the Resources to Recover program 
will act as a labor market intermediary in the following fashion.  First, R2R will create an 
institutionalized “space for conversation” between dislocated workers, the workforce 
development system, and nonprofits through the organizational networking of these actors at 
both the state level (the NC R2R) and the county level (Local R2R).  Like NC VOAD, neither 
the NC R2R nor the Local R2R will actually deliver services; rather, they both coordinate the 
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service delivery activities of its members.  For a detailed description of the specific roles and 
responsibilities for each partner, see Table 1.  
 
As a standalone nonprofit entity at the state level, the NC R2R will create networks 
between the state’s workforce development agencies and relevant state-level nonprofit umbrella 
organizations like the United Way.  When economic disaster strikes a community, the NC R2R 
will coordinate with the relevant public agencies and engage with relevant state-level nonprofit 
networks to mobilize their local affiliates.  Resembling the integration of NC VOAD into the 
emergency management system, this type of organizational networking creates significant 
conversational space for coordination between the workforce agencies and nonprofits—a key 
component in an effective labor market intermediary.  Additionally, before and after a disaster, 
the NC R2R will play a critical role in proving training and technical assistance to local 
nonprofits involved with the Local R2Rs, and as part of this mission will prepare and 
disseminate two documents:   
 
• The Dislocated Worker Training Manual for Nonprofits to prepare nonprofit 
organizations for the unique circumstances of dislocated workers, the specialized 
services they require, and background information on the workforce agencies;  
 
• The Dislocated Worker Pocket Guide, which provides dislocated workers with a short 
and readable list of phone numbers of critical service delivery providers. 
 
The Manual and the Pocket Guide provide a “No-Wrong Doors approach” to serving 
dislocated workers—whatever organization they walk into can point them where they need to go.   
Once guided by the manual or by a nonprofit’s outreach, the dislocated worker can be brought 
into the workforce development system through the single-access point of a county’s JobLink.  
This kind of networking reduces organizational transaction costs and strengthens the ability of 
the workforce system to reach dislocated workers. 
 
At the county level, the Local R2R will serve as the local coordinating body for the 
county’s nonprofit members, in effect creating and institutionalizing networks of nonprofits.  In 
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collaboration with relevant state agencies, Local R2Rs would conduct outreach to bring relevant, 
local organizations to the table, including the local chapters of statewide relief organizations 
mobilized by the NC R2R.  Prior to an economic disaster, these organizations meet together 
quarterly with their workforce development board to discuss planning, develop knowledge, and 
pursue disaster response training.  This type of institutionalized conversational space resembles 
the capacity of both NC VOAD and the CSC in Kannapolis; it also highlights the importance of 
advance planning that proved so effective in responding to Pillowtex. 
 
 According to Recommendation II of the Task Force Recommendations, the local 
workforce board director will play the lead role in economic disaster planning for his/her Local 
Area (Recommendations, 6).  In the R2R model, each of North Carolina’s 24 Local Area 
workforce boards will be responsible for liaising with the Local R2Rs within their footprint and 
providing their member organizations with access to services they provide.  In doing so, R2R 
will also serve as a network for workforce development directors to utilize in their economic 
disaster planning efforts, e.g., to ensure that all relevant nonprofit organizations are connected to 
the workforce development system and trained to partner with relevant workforce agencies.  This 
type of integration allows for the Local R2R to function as an effective labor market 
intermediary by connecting dislocated workers to workforce resources along the networks of 
institutionalized relationships between nonprofits and public agencies. 
 
In the aftermath of an economic disaster, just as NC VOAD convenes an RCC following 
a  natural disaster, the Local R2R will convene a disaster response meeting—conversational 
space—to brief members on the specifics of the layoff and to coordinate their strategies for 
connecting workers to the workforce development system.  Supported by the work of the state-
level NC R2R, this meeting represents the culmination of the Action Agenda’s policy 
recommendation for an “economic VOAD.”  In this meeting, nonprofits are brought together in 
their network, implement their plans, coordinate their response, and ensure that dislocated 
workers have access to the workforce development resources they need for their long-term 
recovery—the essence of a labor market intermediary. 
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Table 1.  Roles and Responsibilities for Resources to Recover 
 
Entity Pre-Disaster Post-Disaster 













• Holds annual meeting with 
statewide networks/non-profits. 
• Facilitates annual 
training/technical assistance for 
non-profit and faith-based 
organizations in helping 
dislocated workers. 
• Facilitates annual “Conditions 
Briefing” to explore risks to the 
economy and the need for early 
planning.  
• Disseminates training manual to 
local workforce boards. 
• NC R2R serves on Workforce 
Commission or as resource.  
• Helps facilitates Local R2R 
meetings for nonprofit/voluntary 
organizations. 
• Facilitates State Response Meeting 
with state networks. 
• Mobilizes state networks. 
• Representative of NC R2R 
participates as a member or 
resource person of state response 
efforts (Economic Transition 










that want to 
help 
dislocated 
workers – can 
be grassroots 
or part of 
larger network 
• The Local R2R meets quarterly 
for training and Conditions 
Briefings provided by Workforce 
Area staff and NC R2R. 
• The Local R2R will have a Local 
Community Coordinator and one 
or more Local Interfaith 
Coordinators. 
• Liases between these 
organizations and the state R2R 
and local workforce board. 
• Invites local organizations to 
participate in the R2R. 
• Briefed by workforce development 
director on needs/issues. 
• Receives last-minute technical 
assistance from workforce director 
and state R2R. 
• Designs and implements nonprofit 
service delivery plans that 
complement workforce plans. 
• Organizes dissemination of Pocket 
and Resource Guides. 
• Liases between these organizations 
and the state R2R, the local 
workforce boards, and local 













• Keeps track of voluntary 
organizations through SHARE 
Network and CARELine. 
• Disseminates Dislocated Worker 
Training Manuals. 
• Hosts annual training/technical 
assistance for local R2R members 
on the workforce system and how 
to help dislocated workers in 
coordination with workforce 
development services. 
• Hosts Conditions Briefing, 
possibly in partnership with local 
economic development 
organization and/or ESC. 
• Hosts R2R meeting. 
• Briefs R2R on nature and impact 
of disaster and needs from the 
workforce development 
perspective. 
• Keeps in contact with local R2R 
throughout the disaster about 
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VII.  Conclusion 
 
This paper course has attempted to address the policy question raised in the Dislocated 
Worker Action Agenda within a broader historical, theoretical, and policy context.  As illustrated 
by the Pillowtex experience and proposed in the program design of R2R, this discussion has 
articulated a role for nonprofit, faith-based, and community-based organizations in responding to 
the effects deindustrialization and economic disasters.  By networking together and creating 
sufficient conversational space for adequate coordination and planning, nonprofits can act as 
labor market intermediaries, connecting dislocated workers to the workforce development 
system.  Based in part on a natural disaster response model, R2R seeks to translate this role into 
reality. 
 
Beyond the proposed program itself, this paper has also hopefully yielded a number of 
generalizable conclusions about the role of nonprofits in economic disaster response efforts.  
First, nonprofits have a critical role to play in coping with economic disasters by providing the 
“space for conversation” that allows dislocated workers to learn about and connect with the 
services offered by the workforce system and other nonprofits.  Secondly, just as cost-reducing 
“conversational space” is formed through inter-firm institutional and relational linkages in 
geography-based industry clusters, nonprofits can create similar linkages through forming 
institutionalized networks.  In forming these networks, they reduce the key type of costs these 
organizations face—the loss of time and mission effectiveness caused by inadequate information.  
This “networking effect” reduces incomplete information and builds organizational capacity for 
nonprofits and workforce development actors in the same ways that geographical clustering and 
networking benefits firms.  Additionally, this networking effect will help dislocated workers 
reverse the crippling transaction costs they face in adjusting to their short-term financial situation 
and long-term recovery through retraining.  Nonprofits need to institutionalize these networks by 
creating an “institutional space” for the conversation to take place—in other words, a regular 
organizational meeting where representatives from nonprofits and the workforce system can 
come together to prepare and respond to economic disasters.  In this way, nonprofits are able to 
function as labor market intermediaries, connecting up workers to the training demanded by local 
industry. 
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  Four years after Pillowtex, economic disasters are a grim reality for many communities in 
rural North Carolina that lack the innate strengths that made the response in Kannapolis so 
successful.  It is hoped that R2R can help address these challenges by mobilizing nonprofit, 
faith-based, and community-based organizations to connect dislocated workers to resources they 
need for immediate relief and long-term recovery. 
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